Publications
"Battles and Bargains: Escalation, Commitment, and Negotiations in Civil War" (2021) with Alyssa K. Prorok International Studies Quarterly 65(2), 406-422.
How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.
How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.
"Complementary Mediation: Exploring Mediator Composition in Civil Wars" (2020) International Interactions 46(6): 893-921.
Mediators improve the chances disputants in civil wars sign a peace agreement by exerting pressure or influence, referred to as leverage. This paper explores how sources of mediator leverage complement one another and draws attention to an under-explored form of influence: credible staying power. I argue that softer forms of leverage (i.e. relationships with the disputants and credible staying power) complement material strength, providing the highest chance of reaching a peace agreement when used together. As multiple sources of leverage mean multiple mediators, this paper also explores the number of and coordination among mediators, acknowledging the tension between multiple mediators increasing available leverage while complicating negotiations by adding more voices to the negotiating table. I argue that more mediators, all else equal, will decrease the probability of success; this effect can be offset, however, by coordination among the mediators. Empirical analyses of 312 mediation efforts in civil wars from 1989 to 2006 find that softer forms of leverage do reinforce material power, producing the greatest probability of concluding in a signed agreement when used together. Moreover, coordination substantially mitigates the negative effect of additional mediators.
Mediators improve the chances disputants in civil wars sign a peace agreement by exerting pressure or influence, referred to as leverage. This paper explores how sources of mediator leverage complement one another and draws attention to an under-explored form of influence: credible staying power. I argue that softer forms of leverage (i.e. relationships with the disputants and credible staying power) complement material strength, providing the highest chance of reaching a peace agreement when used together. As multiple sources of leverage mean multiple mediators, this paper also explores the number of and coordination among mediators, acknowledging the tension between multiple mediators increasing available leverage while complicating negotiations by adding more voices to the negotiating table. I argue that more mediators, all else equal, will decrease the probability of success; this effect can be offset, however, by coordination among the mediators. Empirical analyses of 312 mediation efforts in civil wars from 1989 to 2006 find that softer forms of leverage do reinforce material power, producing the greatest probability of concluding in a signed agreement when used together. Moreover, coordination substantially mitigates the negative effect of additional mediators.
"Competition, Aid, and Violence against Civilians" (2020) with Yooneui Kim. International Interactions 46(5): 696-723.
How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.
How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.
"Multiparty Mediation in Civil War" (2019) in Handbook on Mediating International Crises Eds. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, and David M. Quinn. Edward Elgar Publishing
This chapter explores when multiparty mediation efforts are most likely to occur as well as the effect of mediator composition on mediation success. It argues that the composition of multiparty efforts has important implications for mediation success. Understanding when multiparty efforts are most likely provides the foundation for considering how the nature of multiparty mediation effects mediation outcomes. Salience to the international community is expected to increase the number of mediators who intervene in a conflict-year. As battle deaths increase, the number of mediators also increases, providing support for this expectation. Next, three characteristics of mediation efforts—the number and diversity of mediators as well as coordination—are explored. Number of mediators is expected to reduce the likelihood of mediation success while diversity and coordination are expected to improve outcomes. Diversity and number have meaningful impacts on mediation outcomes in opposing directions, highlighting the importance of mediation composition.
This chapter explores when multiparty mediation efforts are most likely to occur as well as the effect of mediator composition on mediation success. It argues that the composition of multiparty efforts has important implications for mediation success. Understanding when multiparty efforts are most likely provides the foundation for considering how the nature of multiparty mediation effects mediation outcomes. Salience to the international community is expected to increase the number of mediators who intervene in a conflict-year. As battle deaths increase, the number of mediators also increases, providing support for this expectation. Next, three characteristics of mediation efforts—the number and diversity of mediators as well as coordination—are explored. Number of mediators is expected to reduce the likelihood of mediation success while diversity and coordination are expected to improve outcomes. Diversity and number have meaningful impacts on mediation outcomes in opposing directions, highlighting the importance of mediation composition.
"Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes" (2018) with Skyler J. Cranmer. International Interactions 44(2): 217-243.
Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Surprisingly, the empirical conflict literature has yet to address what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed. We argue that the team quality (defined in terms of the coalition’s skill, legitimacy, and coordination) of multinational military coalitions can provide such coalitions with better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing its conflict aims. Empirical tests, using Bayesian models, reveal that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success.
Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Surprisingly, the empirical conflict literature has yet to address what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed. We argue that the team quality (defined in terms of the coalition’s skill, legitimacy, and coordination) of multinational military coalitions can provide such coalitions with better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing its conflict aims. Empirical tests, using Bayesian models, reveal that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success.
"Kantian Fractionalization Predicts the Conflict Propensity of the International System" (2015) with Skyler J. Cranmer & Peter J. Mucha. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112(38):11812-11816.
- Winner of the 2016 Political Ties Award
Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena
in political science, including the study of international conflict.
We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing
that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along
three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for
violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established
conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit
for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures
combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting
system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical
finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal
variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal
relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as
changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction
of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve
as an early warning sign of international instability.
Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena
in political science, including the study of international conflict.
We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing
that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along
three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for
violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established
conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit
for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures
combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting
system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical
finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal
variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal
relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as
changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction
of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve
as an early warning sign of international instability.
"The Reputation Trap of NGO Accountability" (2015) with Stephen E. Gent, Mark J.C. Crescenzi, & Lindsay Reid. International Theory 7(3):426-463.
Can concerns for one’s reputation cause non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
alter their behavior to the detriment of achieving their policy goals? To answer this
question, we explore the relationship between NGOs and their donors. Our theoretical
model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of information in the decision to fund
an NGO’s activities. Reputation can become so important to the NGO’s survival that
it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. As such, reputations
can become a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the information donors
seek while constraining NGOs from realizing policy goals. We apply this logic to the
problem of NGO accountability, which has received increasing attention in recent
years, and demonstrate that the tools used by donors to improve accountability can
trigger unintended consequences. We illustrate this strategic dynamic with two types
of NGO activity: water improvement and international crisis mediation.
Can concerns for one’s reputation cause non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
alter their behavior to the detriment of achieving their policy goals? To answer this
question, we explore the relationship between NGOs and their donors. Our theoretical
model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of information in the decision to fund
an NGO’s activities. Reputation can become so important to the NGO’s survival that
it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. As such, reputations
can become a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the information donors
seek while constraining NGOs from realizing policy goals. We apply this logic to the
problem of NGO accountability, which has received increasing attention in recent
years, and demonstrate that the tools used by donors to improve accountability can
trigger unintended consequences. We illustrate this strategic dynamic with two types
of NGO activity: water improvement and international crisis mediation.
“Complex Dependencies in the Alliance Network” (2012) with Skyler J. Cranmer & Bruce A. Desmarais. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 29(3):279-313.
The multifaceted and strategic interactions inherent in the formation of international military pacts render the alliance decisions of states highly interdependent. Our aim here is to model the network of alliances in such a way as to capture the effects of covariates and account for the complex dependencies inherent in the network. Regression analysis, due to its foundational assumption of conditional independence, is inappropriate for analyzing alliance decisions specifically and interdependent decisions generally. We demonstrate how alliance decisions are interdependent and define the problems associated with the regression analysis of nonindependent dyads. We then show that alliances can naturally be conceived of as constituting a network, where alliance formation is an inherently interdependent process. We proceed by introducing the exponential random graph model for analyzing interdependence in the alliance network and estimating the effect of covariates on alliances.
The multifaceted and strategic interactions inherent in the formation of international military pacts render the alliance decisions of states highly interdependent. Our aim here is to model the network of alliances in such a way as to capture the effects of covariates and account for the complex dependencies inherent in the network. Regression analysis, due to its foundational assumption of conditional independence, is inappropriate for analyzing alliance decisions specifically and interdependent decisions generally. We demonstrate how alliance decisions are interdependent and define the problems associated with the regression analysis of nonindependent dyads. We then show that alliances can naturally be conceived of as constituting a network, where alliance formation is an inherently interdependent process. We proceed by introducing the exponential random graph model for analyzing interdependence in the alliance network and estimating the effect of covariates on alliances.
Grants
Army Research Office (2020), “Tainting the Well or Priming the Pump? The Dynamics of Cooperation in Civil War”, co-PI with Alyssa Prorok.
Folke Bernadotte Academy Research Grant (2019), “Negotiation Dynamics: Evaluating the Cumulative Effects of Negotiations in Civil War Resolution”, co-PI with Alyssa Prorok.
Under Review
"Bias and Balance in Civil War Mediation"
This paper identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation — mediation with multiple active third parties — has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts — those that provide third parties that are biased toward both sides of the dispute — have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebels and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this paper, I develop a measure, mediation balance, that aggregates mediators' biases when multiple third parties are present. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005 and find that mediation balance improves the chances the disputants halt the violence after signing an agreement relative to other mediation efforts. Balanced mediation has weaker effects on getting the disputants to sign an agreement in the first place.
This paper identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation — mediation with multiple active third parties — has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts — those that provide third parties that are biased toward both sides of the dispute — have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebels and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this paper, I develop a measure, mediation balance, that aggregates mediators' biases when multiple third parties are present. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005 and find that mediation balance improves the chances the disputants halt the violence after signing an agreement relative to other mediation efforts. Balanced mediation has weaker effects on getting the disputants to sign an agreement in the first place.
Selected Conference Papers & Works in Progress
"Networks of External Support Network and Civil Conflict Termination"
This project contributes to the literature’s understanding of the consequences of external support in civil wars by considering not only if rebel groups receive support, but also their broader network of support. I argue that more direct supporters, as well as more cohesive networks of support, shape expectations of military victory and the relative value of continued conflict compared to a political settlement. Larger, more cohesive support networks incentivize governments to pursue a negotiated settlement. Such support networks, however, also complicate negotiations and create uncertainty regarding the true distribution of power. Thus, I expect conflicts with larger, more cohesive external support networks to last longer, but ultimately to terminate via political settlement. I test these expectations on patterns of external support to rebel groups in civil wars between 1975 and 2009. The empirical models provide evidence for the theoretical expectations.
This project contributes to the literature’s understanding of the consequences of external support in civil wars by considering not only if rebel groups receive support, but also their broader network of support. I argue that more direct supporters, as well as more cohesive networks of support, shape expectations of military victory and the relative value of continued conflict compared to a political settlement. Larger, more cohesive support networks incentivize governments to pursue a negotiated settlement. Such support networks, however, also complicate negotiations and create uncertainty regarding the true distribution of power. Thus, I expect conflicts with larger, more cohesive external support networks to last longer, but ultimately to terminate via political settlement. I test these expectations on patterns of external support to rebel groups in civil wars between 1975 and 2009. The empirical models provide evidence for the theoretical expectations.
"Regional Violence and Civil War Mediation: How Does Neighborhood Violence Shape Who Mediates?" (with Lindsay Reid)
To what extent does regional instability shape which third parties are willing to engage in civil war mediation? Specifically, how does past and present violence in a country's near abroad -- a country's conflict environment - influence who mediates that country's civil war? We argue that mediators characterized mainly by material capabilities (e.g. major powers and the United Nations) will be deterred from mediation in civil wars that are ongoing in the midst of especially violent conflict environments. A more violent conflict environment raises the costs of mediation, decreases the perceived probability of success, and thus makes mediation less attractive to these mediators. Mediators motivated by immediate concerns of spillover or greater regional instability, however, will be more likely to mediate as the conflict environment worsens. We argue that for regional mediators, the benefits of success are both higher and more tangible, thus offsetting the costs of mediating in particularly violent regions. We test these expectations on civil wars from 1960-2006. Preliminary analyses offer mixed support for our hypotheses.
To what extent does regional instability shape which third parties are willing to engage in civil war mediation? Specifically, how does past and present violence in a country's near abroad -- a country's conflict environment - influence who mediates that country's civil war? We argue that mediators characterized mainly by material capabilities (e.g. major powers and the United Nations) will be deterred from mediation in civil wars that are ongoing in the midst of especially violent conflict environments. A more violent conflict environment raises the costs of mediation, decreases the perceived probability of success, and thus makes mediation less attractive to these mediators. Mediators motivated by immediate concerns of spillover or greater regional instability, however, will be more likely to mediate as the conflict environment worsens. We argue that for regional mediators, the benefits of success are both higher and more tangible, thus offsetting the costs of mediating in particularly violent regions. We test these expectations on civil wars from 1960-2006. Preliminary analyses offer mixed support for our hypotheses.
"Capturing Uncertainty in Network Centrality" (With Abigail Matthews)
Network centrality measures capture an actor’s prestige, importance, or influence in a network. The questions of which actors are most central and how central actors shape their networks have been asked (and answered) in a variety of political contexts. The sampling distributions for most measures of network centrality, however, are unknown. Identifying significantly central actors, therefore, has been a challenge, limiting the range of questions scholars have been able to explore. In this paper, we develop a strategy for calculating uncertainty in centrality measures and illustrate our strategy through simulations, the familiar Florentine marriage network, and the network of formal international military alliances. These simulations and applications demonstrate the value of determining if an actor’s centrality is likely the result of randomness . Scholars can use our strategy for a variety of centrality measures on directed and undirected networks. This approach has intuitive appeal and can improve inferences across not only political science but other social sciences. Without the ability to determine if the level of centrality observed is likely to have come from chance, scholars risk over-stating an actor’s importance or the relative influence of one actor over another.
Network centrality measures capture an actor’s prestige, importance, or influence in a network. The questions of which actors are most central and how central actors shape their networks have been asked (and answered) in a variety of political contexts. The sampling distributions for most measures of network centrality, however, are unknown. Identifying significantly central actors, therefore, has been a challenge, limiting the range of questions scholars have been able to explore. In this paper, we develop a strategy for calculating uncertainty in centrality measures and illustrate our strategy through simulations, the familiar Florentine marriage network, and the network of formal international military alliances. These simulations and applications demonstrate the value of determining if an actor’s centrality is likely the result of randomness . Scholars can use our strategy for a variety of centrality measures on directed and undirected networks. This approach has intuitive appeal and can improve inferences across not only political science but other social sciences. Without the ability to determine if the level of centrality observed is likely to have come from chance, scholars risk over-stating an actor’s importance or the relative influence of one actor over another.
"Complex Interdependence as a Multiplex Network Phenomenon" (With W.K. Winecoff and Heather Ba)
This paper re-conceptualizes complex interdependence in the international political economy in multiplex network terms that re-emphasize the relational nature of IPE. We argue that complex interdependence is not merely a rhetorical device, nor a vague concept, but a measurable quantity that can be best understood conceptually and captured empirically using theory and methodology from modern network science. We establish this by detecting distinct communities within the international economic system. We show that this methodology provides a useful pathway towards the examination of key macro outcomes in international political economy and international relations -- including system stability, system change, and the distribution of power through structural prominence -- that are increasingly necessary for understanding of lower-level outcomes such as the choice of national economic policies and firm-level behaviors.
This paper re-conceptualizes complex interdependence in the international political economy in multiplex network terms that re-emphasize the relational nature of IPE. We argue that complex interdependence is not merely a rhetorical device, nor a vague concept, but a measurable quantity that can be best understood conceptually and captured empirically using theory and methodology from modern network science. We establish this by detecting distinct communities within the international economic system. We show that this methodology provides a useful pathway towards the examination of key macro outcomes in international political economy and international relations -- including system stability, system change, and the distribution of power through structural prominence -- that are increasingly necessary for understanding of lower-level outcomes such as the choice of national economic policies and firm-level behaviors.
"Mediator Leverage and Context-Specific Peace Agreements" (with Lindsay Reid)
How do mediators influence the nature of civil war peace agreements? Extant research identifies that mediation increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement, yet little is known about the content of mediated settlements. Do mediators push settlement at any cost, or do mediators facilitate the signing of settlements that fit a conflict's causes and context? Our paper offers a novel extension of both the mediation and peace agreement literature by building a theory of how mediators not only generate agreements but also how they shape the content of those agreements. This paper focuses on one dimension of peace agreements, their context-specificity, or the extent to which the agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. We argue that mediators use different sources of leverage to influence negotiations and that the type leverage the mediator has affects not only the likelihood of an agreement, but also its content. We test our theory of mediators and the context-specificity of peace agreements using original data on mediation efforts and the content of settlements signed between 1989 and 2006. Preliminary analyses confirm that different mediation styles do indeed have tangible effects on the context-specificity of agreements.
How do mediators influence the nature of civil war peace agreements? Extant research identifies that mediation increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement, yet little is known about the content of mediated settlements. Do mediators push settlement at any cost, or do mediators facilitate the signing of settlements that fit a conflict's causes and context? Our paper offers a novel extension of both the mediation and peace agreement literature by building a theory of how mediators not only generate agreements but also how they shape the content of those agreements. This paper focuses on one dimension of peace agreements, their context-specificity, or the extent to which the agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. We argue that mediators use different sources of leverage to influence negotiations and that the type leverage the mediator has affects not only the likelihood of an agreement, but also its content. We test our theory of mediators and the context-specificity of peace agreements using original data on mediation efforts and the content of settlements signed between 1989 and 2006. Preliminary analyses confirm that different mediation styles do indeed have tangible effects on the context-specificity of agreements.
"Mediator Learning: The Evolution of Peace Agreements"
The motivation of this project is two-fold. The first is to investigate how and if mediators learn over time. The goal of this first piece is to understand how mediators use past mediation successes and failures to shape future mediation attempts. While there are many dimensions across which mediators could learn, this project focuses on the content of peace agreements. Do mediators change how they craft peace agreements based upon their past experiences? Are provisions that are not implemented or create a barrier to agreement/implementation less likely to be included in future agreements? Likewise are provisions included in successful agreements likely to be seen in subsequent agreements? The second piece of this project looks at how mediator experience influences the likelihood an agreement is adopted as well as how likely that agreement is to be implemented and how it influences the post-conflict peace. This part of the project focuses on how the peace agreements brokered by mediators vary in their implementation and impact. Mediator experience is one factor that is likely to influence how successfully agreements are implemented as mediators with past experience negotiating civil conflicts will have more opportunities to learn from past obstacles as well as past successful implementation processes.
The motivation of this project is two-fold. The first is to investigate how and if mediators learn over time. The goal of this first piece is to understand how mediators use past mediation successes and failures to shape future mediation attempts. While there are many dimensions across which mediators could learn, this project focuses on the content of peace agreements. Do mediators change how they craft peace agreements based upon their past experiences? Are provisions that are not implemented or create a barrier to agreement/implementation less likely to be included in future agreements? Likewise are provisions included in successful agreements likely to be seen in subsequent agreements? The second piece of this project looks at how mediator experience influences the likelihood an agreement is adopted as well as how likely that agreement is to be implemented and how it influences the post-conflict peace. This part of the project focuses on how the peace agreements brokered by mediators vary in their implementation and impact. Mediator experience is one factor that is likely to influence how successfully agreements are implemented as mediators with past experience negotiating civil conflicts will have more opportunities to learn from past obstacles as well as past successful implementation processes.