Publications
"Multiparty Mediation in Civil War" (2019) in Handbook on Mediating International Crises Eds. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, and David M. Quinn. Edward Elgar Publishing
This chapter explores when multiparty mediation efforts are most likely to occur as well as the effect of mediator composition on mediation success. It argues that the composition of multiparty efforts has important implications for mediation success. Understanding when multiparty efforts are most likely provides the foundation for considering how the nature of multiparty mediation effects mediation outcomes. Salience to the international community is expected to increase the number of mediators who intervene in a conflict-year. As battle deaths increase, the number of mediators also increases, providing support for this expectation. Next, three characteristics of mediation efforts—the number and diversity of mediators as well as coordination—are explored. Number of mediators is expected to reduce the likelihood of mediation success while diversity and coordination are expected to improve outcomes. Diversity and number have meaningful impacts on mediation outcomes in opposing directions, highlighting the importance of mediation composition.
This chapter explores when multiparty mediation efforts are most likely to occur as well as the effect of mediator composition on mediation success. It argues that the composition of multiparty efforts has important implications for mediation success. Understanding when multiparty efforts are most likely provides the foundation for considering how the nature of multiparty mediation effects mediation outcomes. Salience to the international community is expected to increase the number of mediators who intervene in a conflict-year. As battle deaths increase, the number of mediators also increases, providing support for this expectation. Next, three characteristics of mediation efforts—the number and diversity of mediators as well as coordination—are explored. Number of mediators is expected to reduce the likelihood of mediation success while diversity and coordination are expected to improve outcomes. Diversity and number have meaningful impacts on mediation outcomes in opposing directions, highlighting the importance of mediation composition.
"Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes" (2018) with Skyler J. Cranmer. International Interactions 44(2): 217-243.
Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Surprisingly, the empirical conflict literature has yet to address what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed. We argue that the team quality (defined in terms of the coalition’s skill, legitimacy, and coordination) of multinational military coalitions can provide such coalitions with better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing its conflict aims. Empirical tests, using Bayesian models, reveal that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success.
Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Surprisingly, the empirical conflict literature has yet to address what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed. We argue that the team quality (defined in terms of the coalition’s skill, legitimacy, and coordination) of multinational military coalitions can provide such coalitions with better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing its conflict aims. Empirical tests, using Bayesian models, reveal that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success.
"Kantian Fractionalization Predicts the Conflict Propensity of the International System" (2015) with Skyler J. Cranmer & Peter J. Mucha. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112(38):11812-11816.
- Winner of the 2016 Political Ties Award
Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena
in political science, including the study of international conflict.
We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing
that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along
three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for
violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established
conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit
for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures
combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting
system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical
finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal
variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal
relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as
changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction
of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve
as an early warning sign of international instability.
Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena
in political science, including the study of international conflict.
We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing
that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along
three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for
violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established
conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit
for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures
combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting
system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical
finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal
variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal
relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as
changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction
of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve
as an early warning sign of international instability.
"The Reputation Trap of NGO Accountability" (2015) with Stephen E. Gent, Mark J.C. Crescenzi, & Lindsay Reid. International Theory 7(3):426-463.
Can concerns for one’s reputation cause non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
alter their behavior to the detriment of achieving their policy goals? To answer this
question, we explore the relationship between NGOs and their donors. Our theoretical
model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of information in the decision to fund
an NGO’s activities. Reputation can become so important to the NGO’s survival that
it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. As such, reputations
can become a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the information donors
seek while constraining NGOs from realizing policy goals. We apply this logic to the
problem of NGO accountability, which has received increasing attention in recent
years, and demonstrate that the tools used by donors to improve accountability can
trigger unintended consequences. We illustrate this strategic dynamic with two types
of NGO activity: water improvement and international crisis mediation.
Can concerns for one’s reputation cause non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
alter their behavior to the detriment of achieving their policy goals? To answer this
question, we explore the relationship between NGOs and their donors. Our theoretical
model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of information in the decision to fund
an NGO’s activities. Reputation can become so important to the NGO’s survival that
it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. As such, reputations
can become a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the information donors
seek while constraining NGOs from realizing policy goals. We apply this logic to the
problem of NGO accountability, which has received increasing attention in recent
years, and demonstrate that the tools used by donors to improve accountability can
trigger unintended consequences. We illustrate this strategic dynamic with two types
of NGO activity: water improvement and international crisis mediation.
“Complex Dependencies in the Alliance Network” (2012) with Skyler J. Cranmer & Bruce A. Desmarais. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 29(3):279-313.
The multifaceted and strategic interactions inherent in the formation of international military pacts render the alliance decisions of states highly interdependent. Our aim here is to model the network of alliances in such a way as to capture the effects of covariates and account for the complex dependencies inherent in the network. Regression analysis, due to its foundational assumption of conditional independence, is inappropriate for analyzing alliance decisions specifically and interdependent decisions generally. We demonstrate how alliance decisions are interdependent and define the problems associated with the regression analysis of nonindependent dyads. We then show that alliances can naturally be conceived of as constituting a network, where alliance formation is an inherently interdependent process. We proceed by introducing the exponential random graph model for analyzing interdependence in the alliance network and estimating the effect of covariates on alliances.
The multifaceted and strategic interactions inherent in the formation of international military pacts render the alliance decisions of states highly interdependent. Our aim here is to model the network of alliances in such a way as to capture the effects of covariates and account for the complex dependencies inherent in the network. Regression analysis, due to its foundational assumption of conditional independence, is inappropriate for analyzing alliance decisions specifically and interdependent decisions generally. We demonstrate how alliance decisions are interdependent and define the problems associated with the regression analysis of nonindependent dyads. We then show that alliances can naturally be conceived of as constituting a network, where alliance formation is an inherently interdependent process. We proceed by introducing the exponential random graph model for analyzing interdependence in the alliance network and estimating the effect of covariates on alliances.
Grants
Folke Bernadotte Academy Research Grant (2019), Folke Bernadotte Academy, Grant Award of $27,033, “Negotiation Dynamics: Evaluating the Cumulative Effects of Negotiations in Civil War Resolution”, co-PI with Alyssa Prorok.
Under Review
Bias and Balance in Civil War Mediation
This paper identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation — mediation with multiple active third parties — has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts — those that provide third parties that are biased toward both sides of the dispute — have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebels and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this paper, I develop a measure, mediation balance, that aggregates mediators' biases when multiple third parties are present. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005 and find that mediation balance improves the chances the disputants halt the violence after signing an agreement relative to other mediation efforts. Balanced mediation has weaker effects on getting the disputants to sign an agreement in the first place.
This paper identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation — mediation with multiple active third parties — has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts — those that provide third parties that are biased toward both sides of the dispute — have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebels and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this paper, I develop a measure, mediation balance, that aggregates mediators' biases when multiple third parties are present. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005 and find that mediation balance improves the chances the disputants halt the violence after signing an agreement relative to other mediation efforts. Balanced mediation has weaker effects on getting the disputants to sign an agreement in the first place.
Complementary Mediation: Exploring Mediator Composition in Civil Wars
Mediators improve the chances disputants in civil wars sign a peace agreement by exerting pressure or influence, referred to as leverage. This paper explores how sources of mediator leverage complement one another and draws attention to an under-explored form of influence: credible staying power. I argue that softer forms of leverage (i.e. relationships with the disputants and credible staying power) complement material strength, providing the highest chance of reaching a peace agreement when used together. As multiple sources of leverage mean multiple mediators, this paper also explores the number of and coordination among mediators, acknowledging the tension between multiple mediators increasing
available leverage while complicating negotiations by adding more voices to the negotiating table. I argue that more mediators, all else equal, will decrease the probability of success; this effect can be offset, however, by coordination among the mediators. Empirical analyses of 312 mediation efforts in civil wars from 1989 to 2006 find that softer forms of leverage do reinforce material power, producing the greatest probability of concluding in a signed agreement when used together. Moreover, coordination substantially mitigates the negative effect of additional mediators.
Mediators improve the chances disputants in civil wars sign a peace agreement by exerting pressure or influence, referred to as leverage. This paper explores how sources of mediator leverage complement one another and draws attention to an under-explored form of influence: credible staying power. I argue that softer forms of leverage (i.e. relationships with the disputants and credible staying power) complement material strength, providing the highest chance of reaching a peace agreement when used together. As multiple sources of leverage mean multiple mediators, this paper also explores the number of and coordination among mediators, acknowledging the tension between multiple mediators increasing available leverage while complicating negotiations by adding more voices to the negotiating table. I argue that more mediators, all else equal, will decrease the probability of success; this effect can be offset, however, by coordination among the mediators. Empirical analyses of 312 mediation efforts in civil wars from 1989 to 2006 find that softer forms of leverage do reinforce material power, producing the greatest probability of concluding in a signed agreement when used together. Moreover, coordination substantially mitigates the negative effect of additional mediators.
Revealed Sincerity and Negotiations in Civil War (with Alyssa Prorok)
Why do some civil war peace processes stall, while others build momentum? This paper examines how prior negotiations influence future negotiations during civil war. We argue disputants have private information about their level of sincerity when engaging in peace talks, which contributes to the severity of the commitment problem. Combatants learn about their opponent's sincerity by observing their behavior surrounding negotiations. They reveal sincerity by reducing battlefield activity immediately after talks while revealing insincerity by increasing battlefield activity. Revealed (in)sincerity influences willingness to engage in subsequent negotiations; if previous negotiations revealed sincerity, new negotiations are more likely to occur, while negotiations that reveal insincerity will discourage future negotiations. In addition, we hypothesize that third-party involvement mitigates the negative effect of revealed insincerity. We test our expectations on monthly data on civil conflicts in Africa, finding revealed sincerity does increase the probability of subsequent negotiations, conditioned on third-party involvement.
Why do some civil war peace processes stall, while others build momentum? This paper examines how prior negotiations influence future negotiations during civil war. We argue disputants have private information about their level of sincerity when engaging in peace talks, which contributes to the severity of the commitment problem. Combatants learn about their opponent's sincerity by observing their behavior surrounding negotiations. They reveal sincerity by reducing battlefield activity immediately after talks while revealing insincerity by increasing battlefield activity. Revealed (in)sincerity influences willingness to engage in subsequent negotiations; if previous negotiations revealed sincerity, new negotiations are more likely to occur, while negotiations that reveal insincerity will discourage future negotiations. In addition, we hypothesize that third-party involvement mitigates the negative effect of revealed insincerity. We test our expectations on monthly data on civil conflicts in Africa, finding revealed sincerity does increase the probability of subsequent negotiations, conditioned on third-party involvement.
Competition, Aid, and Violence against Civilians (with Yooneui Kim)
Why do donor governments provide aid to fragile countries if it prolongs civil wars and increases violence against civilians? Previous research finds that strategic motivations explain donor aid decisions; donors balance their own interests with recipient behavior. We help identify when security interests are stronger than humanitarian concerns, especially in the context of violence against civilians. We argue that competition with other donors reduces donor sensitivity to government behavior by making geopolitical interests more salient and thus reducing the influence of humanitarian concerns. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 173 recipients between 1989-2013, we find that the effect of government violence against civilians is conditioned by donor competition. This paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior: violence against civilians.
Why do donor governments provide aid to fragile countries if it prolongs civil wars and increases violence against civilians? Previous research finds that strategic motivations explain donor aid decisions; donors balance their own interests with recipient behavior. We help identify when security interests are stronger than humanitarian concerns, especially in the context of violence against civilians. We argue that competition with other donors reduces donor sensitivity to government behavior by making geopolitical interests more salient and thus reducing the influence of humanitarian concerns. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 173 recipients between 1989-2013, we find that the effect of government violence against civilians is conditioned by donor competition. This paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior: violence against civilians.
Selected Conference Papers & Works in Progress
External Support Networks in Civil Wars
External support for disputants in civil wars has a known impact on the duration, lethality, and conclusion of civil conflicts. The nature of this support takes many forms from providing information to sending troops. While previous studies have explored who sends support and how this support influences conflict outcomes, the network structure and patterns of indirect relationships are ignored. This project uses the UCDP External Support Database to explicitly model the network of external support. First, this project explores the patterns of support (e.g.reciprocity and transitivity) in the external support network. Then, it evaluates to what extent past patterns of support can predict future relationships. The analysis is conducted first at the conflict level and then at a global level, allowing for consideration of conflict-specific factors that influence support patterns as well as acknowledging that the decision to provide support to a disputant in one civil war is rarely independent of involvement in other current or potential conflicts. Specifically, I investigate if sources of support for those aiding the same side are complementary or redundant (using diversity indices), if support is reciprocated when appropriate, and if support for the rebels and the government balance over time. I hypothesize that these dynamics are a function of not only direct connections, but also indirect relationships. Improving our understanding of the dynamics of support in civil conflicts contributes to an important and growing literature on when and how external actors intervene in civil conflicts.
External support for disputants in civil wars has a known impact on the duration, lethality, and conclusion of civil conflicts. The nature of this support takes many forms from providing information to sending troops. While previous studies have explored who sends support and how this support influences conflict outcomes, the network structure and patterns of indirect relationships are ignored. This project uses the UCDP External Support Database to explicitly model the network of external support. First, this project explores the patterns of support (e.g.reciprocity and transitivity) in the external support network. Then, it evaluates to what extent past patterns of support can predict future relationships. The analysis is conducted first at the conflict level and then at a global level, allowing for consideration of conflict-specific factors that influence support patterns as well as acknowledging that the decision to provide support to a disputant in one civil war is rarely independent of involvement in other current or potential conflicts. Specifically, I investigate if sources of support for those aiding the same side are complementary or redundant (using diversity indices), if support is reciprocated when appropriate, and if support for the rebels and the government balance over time. I hypothesize that these dynamics are a function of not only direct connections, but also indirect relationships. Improving our understanding of the dynamics of support in civil conflicts contributes to an important and growing literature on when and how external actors intervene in civil conflicts.
Mediator Leverage and Context-Specific Peace Agreements (with Lindsay Reid)
How do mediators influence the nature of civil war peace agreements? Extant research identifies that mediation increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement, yet little is known about the content of mediated settlements. Do mediators push settlement at any cost, or do mediators facilitate the signing of settlements that fit a conflict's causes and context? Our paper offers a novel extension of both the mediation and peace agreement literature by building a theory of how mediators not only generate agreements but also how they shape the content of those agreements. This paper focuses on one dimension of peace agreements, their context-specificity, or the extent to which the agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. We argue that mediators use different sources of leverage to influence negotiations and that the type leverage the mediator has affects not only the likelihood of an agreement, but also its content. We test our theory of mediators and the context-specificity of peace agreements using original data on mediation efforts and the content of settlements signed between 1989 and 2006. Preliminary analyses confirm that different mediation styles do indeed have tangible effects on the context-specificity of agreements.
How do mediators influence the nature of civil war peace agreements? Extant research identifies that mediation increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement, yet little is known about the content of mediated settlements. Do mediators push settlement at any cost, or do mediators facilitate the signing of settlements that fit a conflict's causes and context? Our paper offers a novel extension of both the mediation and peace agreement literature by building a theory of how mediators not only generate agreements but also how they shape the content of those agreements. This paper focuses on one dimension of peace agreements, their context-specificity, or the extent to which the agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. We argue that mediators use different sources of leverage to influence negotiations and that the type leverage the mediator has affects not only the likelihood of an agreement, but also its content. We test our theory of mediators and the context-specificity of peace agreements using original data on mediation efforts and the content of settlements signed between 1989 and 2006. Preliminary analyses confirm that different mediation styles do indeed have tangible effects on the context-specificity of agreements.
Complex Interdependence as a Network Phenomenon: The Case of Trade (With W.K. Winecoff)
This paper re-conceptualizes complex interdependence in the international political economy in multiplex network terms that re-emphasize the relational nature of IPE. We argue that complex interdependence is not merely a rhetorical device, nor a vague concept, but a measurable quantity that can be best understood conceptually and captured empirically using theory and methodology from modern network science. We establish this in the case of trade, and detect distinct communities within this structure. We show that this methodology provides a useful pathway towards the examination of key macro outcomes in international political economy and international relations -- including system stability, system change, and the distribution of power through structural prominence -- that are increasingly necessary for understanding of lower-level outcomes such as the choice of national economic policies and firm-level behaviors.
This paper re-conceptualizes complex interdependence in the international political economy in multiplex network terms that re-emphasize the relational nature of IPE. We argue that complex interdependence is not merely a rhetorical device, nor a vague concept, but a measurable quantity that can be best understood conceptually and captured empirically using theory and methodology from modern network science. We establish this in the case of trade, and detect distinct communities within this structure. We show that this methodology provides a useful pathway towards the examination of key macro outcomes in international political economy and international relations -- including system stability, system change, and the distribution of power through structural prominence -- that are increasingly necessary for understanding of lower-level outcomes such as the choice of national economic policies and firm-level behaviors.