Publications

"Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes" With Skyler J. Cranmer. International Interactions Published Online Oct. 2017

Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Surprisingly, the empirical conflict literature has yet to address what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed. We argue that the team quality (defined in terms of the coalition’s skill, legitimacy, and coordination) of multinational military coalitions can provide such coalitions with better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing its conflict aims. Empirical tests, using Bayesian models, reveal that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success.

      Abstract

Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Surprisingly, the empirical conflict literature has yet to address what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed. We argue that the team quality (defined in terms of the coalition’s skill, legitimacy, and coordination) of multinational military coalitions can provide such coalitions with better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing its conflict aims. Empirical tests, using Bayesian models, reveal that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success.

"Kantian Fractionalization Predicts the Conflict Propensity of the International System" With Skyler J. Cranmer & Peter J. Mucha. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112(38):11812-11816, 2015.

• Winner of the 2016 Political Ties Award

Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena in political science, including the study of international conflict. We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve as an early warning sign of international instability.

      Abstract

Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena in political science, including the study of international conflict. We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve as an early warning sign of international instability.

"The Reputation Trap of NGO Accountability" With Stephen E. Gent, Mark J.C. Crescenzi, & Lindsay Reid. International Theory​ 7(3):426-463, 2015.

Can concerns for one’s reputation cause non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to alter their behavior to the detriment of achieving their policy goals? To answer this question, we explore the relationship between NGOs and their donors. Our theoretical model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of information in the decision to fund an NGO’s activities. Reputation can become so important to the NGO’s survival that it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. As such, reputations can become a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the information donors seek while constraining NGOs from realizing policy goals. We apply this logic to the problem of NGO accountability, which has received increasing attention in recent years, and demonstrate that the tools used by donors to improve accountability can trigger unintended consequences. We illustrate this strategic dynamic with two types of NGO activity: water improvement and international crisis mediation.

      Abstract

Can concerns for one’s reputation cause non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to alter their behavior to the detriment of achieving their policy goals? To answer this question, we explore the relationship between NGOs and their donors. Our theoretical model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of information in the decision to fund an NGO’s activities. Reputation can become so important to the NGO’s survival that it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. As such, reputations can become a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the information donors seek while constraining NGOs from realizing policy goals. We apply this logic to the problem of NGO accountability, which has received increasing attention in recent years, and demonstrate that the tools used by donors to improve accountability can trigger unintended consequences. We illustrate this strategic dynamic with two types of NGO activity: water improvement and international crisis mediation.

“Complex Dependencies in the Alliance Network” With Skyler J. Cranmer & Bruce A. Desmarais. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 29(3):279-313, 2012.

The multifaceted and strategic interactions inherent in the formation of international military pacts render the alliance decisions of states highly interdependent. Our aim here is to model the network of alliances in such a way as to capture the effects of covariates and account for the complex dependencies inherent in the network. Regression analysis, due to its foundational assumption of conditional independence, is inappropriate for analyzing alliance decisions specifically and interdependent decisions generally. We demonstrate how alliance decisions are interdependent and define the problems associated with the regression analysis of nonindependent dyads. We then show that alliances can naturally be conceived of as constituting a network, where alliance formation is an inherently interdependent process. We proceed by introducing the exponential random graph model for analyzing interdependence in the alliance network and estimating the effect of covariates on alliances.

      Abstract

The multifaceted and strategic interactions inherent in the formation of international military pacts render the alliance decisions of states highly interdependent. Our aim here is to model the network of alliances in such a way as to capture the effects of covariates and account for the complex dependencies inherent in the network. Regression analysis, due to its foundational assumption of conditional independence, is inappropriate for analyzing alliance decisions specifically and interdependent decisions generally. We demonstrate how alliance decisions are interdependent and define the problems associated with the regression analysis of nonindependent dyads. We then show that alliances can naturally be conceived of as constituting a network, where alliance formation is an inherently interdependent process. We proceed by introducing the exponential random graph model for analyzing interdependence in the alliance network and estimating the effect of covariates on alliances.

Under Review

Bias and Balance in Civil War Mediation

Having multiple mediators negotiating with the disputants at the same time is widely considered to be ineffective. This paper identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation can have positive effects on conflict resolution. When multiparty mediation provides third parties that are biased toward both sides of the dispute, it can alleviate the credibility concerns felt by both the rebels and the government. These balanced mediation efforts have unique advantages in generating a peaceful outcome, making them more likely to succeed than unbalanced and impartial efforts. In this paper I develop a measure, mediation balance, that aggregates individual mediators’ biases when multiple mediators are present. I then test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005.

      Abstract

Having multiple mediators negotiating with the disputants at the same time is widely considered to be ineffective. This paper identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation can have positive effects on conflict resolution. When multiparty mediation provides third parties that are biased toward both sides of the dispute, it can alleviate the credibility concerns felt by both the rebels and the government. These balanced mediation efforts have unique advantages in generating a peaceful outcome, making them more likely to succeed than unbalanced and impartial efforts. In this paper I develop a measure, mediation balance, that aggregates individual mediators’ biases when multiple mediators are present. I then test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005.

Selected Conference Papers & Works in Progress

Identifying Characteristics of the Mediation Dream Team: The Importance of Coordinated and Complementary Efforts

The substantial variance within multiparty mediation efforts has significant implications for the usefulness of mediation in conflicts seeking a peaceful resolution. Multiple mediators sometimes complicate the negotiating environment, decreasing the chances of peace and giving multiparty mediation a reputation for ineffectiveness. In particular, multiple mediators can result in forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding. Not all multiparty efforts, however, are equally plagued by these problems. Moreover, some multiparty efforts provide unique advantages that make them better able to influence the combatants and generate an agreement. These advantages not only increase the probability of a negotiated settlement, but also of successfully implementing the settlement and producing a lasting peace. This project explores these differences, providing a more nuanced theoretical framework for considering the effect of multiparty mediation on conflict resolution. Beginning with the assertion that mediation is a club, and as such is vulnerable to overcrowding, this project explores the ideal composition of mediation teams. As a heterogeneous club, some potential mediators are more desirable than others. Desirable mediators provide a complementary source of leverage and coordinate within other mediators, minimizing the risk of overcrowding. Therefore, the mediation dream team is a coordinated and complementary collection of international actors. To evaluate these assertions, new data on mediation team coordination was collected. Additionally, a new measure of complementary mediation efforts was developed. The statistical analyses conducted confirm that these differences in multiparty mediation efforts have significant and substantial influence on mediation success.

      Abstract

The substantial variance within multiparty mediation efforts has significant implications for the usefulness of mediation in conflicts seeking a peaceful resolution. Multiple mediators sometimes complicate the negotiating environment, decreasing the chances of peace and giving multiparty mediation a reputation for ineffectiveness. In particular, multiple mediators can result in forum-shopping, mixed messages, and free-riding. Not all multiparty efforts, however, are equally plagued by these problems. Moreover, some multiparty efforts provide unique advantages that make them better able to influence the combatants and generate an agreement. These advantages not only increase the probability of a negotiated settlement, but also of successfully implementing the settlement and producing a lasting peace. This project explores these differences, providing a more nuanced theoretical framework for considering the effect of multiparty mediation on conflict resolution. Beginning with the assertion that mediation is a club, and as such is vulnerable to overcrowding, this project explores the ideal composition of mediation teams. As a heterogeneous club, some potential mediators are more desirable than others. Desirable mediators provide a complementary source of leverage and coordinate within other mediators, minimizing the risk of overcrowding. Therefore, the mediation dream team is a coordinated and complementary collection of international actors. To evaluate these assertions, new data on mediation team coordination was collected. Additionally, a new measure of complementary mediation efforts was developed. The statistical analyses conducted confirm that these differences in multiparty mediation efforts have significant and substantial influence on mediation success.

Multiparty Mediation Onset: Patterns of Selection

​

The study of mediation is complicated by the need to disentangle the selection effects of mediation from its process effects. Many scholars have contributed to our understanding of mediation by exploring when, how, and in what conditions third parties intervene in conflicts. This project seeks to build upon this literature by considering the patterns of multiparty mediation onset. Multiparty mediation (when multiple mediators intervene in a conflict simultaneously) has become increasingly common and raises new questions about what types of conflicts attract not only a (single) mediator, but multiple mediators. This project explores these questions using data that draws on the CWM set of cases to code characteristics of the (multiparty) mediation effort in order to explore not only when we see multiparty mediation but when we see certain types of multiparty mediation as well. Specifically the biases of the mediators and the level of cooperation among the mediators are explored.

      Abstract

The study of mediation is complicated by the need to disentangle the selection effects of mediation from its process effects. Many scholars have contributed to our understanding of mediation by exploring when, how, and in what conditions third parties intervene in conflicts. This project seeks to build upon this literature by considering the patterns of multiparty mediation onset. Multiparty mediation (when multiple mediators intervene in a conflict simultaneously) has become increasingly common and raises new questions about what types of conflicts attract not only a (single) mediator, but multiple mediators. This project explores these questions using data that draws on the CWM set of cases to code characteristics of the (multiparty) mediation effort in order to explore not only when we see multiparty mediation but when we see certain types of multiparty mediation as well. Specifically the biases of the mediators and the level of cooperation among the mediators are explored.

Mediator Leverage and Context-Specific Peace Agreements 
(with Lindsay Reid)

How do mediators influence the nature of civil war peace agreements? Extant research identifies that mediation increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement, yet little is known about the content of mediated settlements. Do mediators push settlement at any cost, or do mediators facilitate the signing of settlements that fit a conflict's causes and context? Our paper offers a novel extension of both the mediation and peace agreement literature by building a theory of how mediators not only generate agreements but also how they shape the content of those agreements. This paper focuses on one dimension of peace agreements, their context-specificity, or the extent to which the agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. We argue that mediators use different sources of leverage to influence negotiations and that the type leverage the mediator has affects not only the likelihood of an agreement, but also its content. We test our theory of mediators and the context-specificity of peace agreements using original data on mediation efforts and the content of settlements signed between 1989 and 2006. Preliminary analyses confirm that different mediation styles do indeed have tangible effects on the context-specificity of agreements.

      Abstract

How do mediators influence the nature of civil war peace agreements? Extant research identifies that mediation increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement, yet little is known about the content of mediated settlements. Do mediators push settlement at any cost, or do mediators facilitate the signing of settlements that fit a conflict's causes and context? Our paper offers a novel extension of both the mediation and peace agreement literature by building a theory of how mediators not only generate agreements but also how they shape the content of those agreements. This paper focuses on one dimension of peace agreements, their context-specificity, or the extent to which the agreements address the underlying causes of conflict. We argue that mediators use different sources of leverage to influence negotiations and that the type leverage the mediator has affects not only the likelihood of an agreement, but also its content. We test our theory of mediators and the context-specificity of peace agreements using original data on mediation efforts and the content of settlements signed between 1989 and 2006. Preliminary analyses confirm that different mediation styles do indeed have tangible effects on the context-specificity of agreements.

Opening the Black Box of Mediation
(with Stephen E. Gent)