Publications
"Bias and balance in civil war mediation" (2024) Journal of Peace Research 61(4): 627-642.
This article identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation – mediation with multiple active third parties – has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts – those providing third parties biased toward both sides of the dispute – have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebel group and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this article, I develop a measure, Mediation balance, which aggregates the mediators’ biases when multiple third parties are present. I also consider, both theoretically and empirically, how the number of mediators interacts with mediation balance to shape outcomes. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005, finding that balanced mediation efforts improve the probability of reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the strength of this effect is influenced by the number of mediators involved. Mediation balance also influences the probability the agreement halts the violence, albeit in unexpected ways.
This article identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation – mediation with multiple active third parties – has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts – those providing third parties biased toward both sides of the dispute – have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebel group and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this article, I develop a measure, Mediation balance, which aggregates the mediators’ biases when multiple third parties are present. I also consider, both theoretically and empirically, how the number of mediators interacts with mediation balance to shape outcomes. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005, finding that balanced mediation efforts improve the probability of reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the strength of this effect is influenced by the number of mediators involved. Mediation balance also influences the probability the agreement halts the violence, albeit in unexpected ways.
"Network Analysis" (2022) with Lindsey A. Goldberg in Handbook of Research Methods in International Relations Eds. R. Joseph Huddleston, Tom Jamieson, and Patrick James. Edward Elgar Publishing
This chapter discussed the why, when, and how of using networks to answer questions in International Relations research.
This chapter discussed the why, when, and how of using networks to answer questions in International Relations research.
"Battles and Bargains: Escalation, Commitment, and Negotiations in Civil War" (2021) with Alyssa K. Prorok International Studies Quarterly 65(2): 406-422.
How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.
How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.
"Complementary Mediation: Exploring Mediator Composition in Civil Wars" (2020) International Interactions 46(6): 893-921.
Mediators improve the chances disputants in civil wars sign a peace agreement by exerting pressure or influence, referred to as leverage. This paper explores how sources of mediator leverage complement one another and draws attention to an under-explored form of influence: credible staying power. I argue that softer forms of leverage (i.e. relationships with the disputants and credible staying power) complement material strength, providing the highest chance of reaching a peace agreement when used together. As multiple sources of leverage mean multiple mediators, this paper also explores the number of and coordination among mediators, acknowledging the tension between multiple mediators increasing available leverage while complicating negotiations by adding more voices to the negotiating table. I argue that more mediators, all else equal, will decrease the probability of success; this effect can be offset, however, by coordination among the mediators. Empirical analyses of 312 mediation efforts in civil wars from 1989 to 2006 find that softer forms of leverage do reinforce material power, producing the greatest probability of concluding in a signed agreement when used together. Moreover, coordination substantially mitigates the negative effect of additional mediators.
Mediators improve the chances disputants in civil wars sign a peace agreement by exerting pressure or influence, referred to as leverage. This paper explores how sources of mediator leverage complement one another and draws attention to an under-explored form of influence: credible staying power. I argue that softer forms of leverage (i.e. relationships with the disputants and credible staying power) complement material strength, providing the highest chance of reaching a peace agreement when used together. As multiple sources of leverage mean multiple mediators, this paper also explores the number of and coordination among mediators, acknowledging the tension between multiple mediators increasing available leverage while complicating negotiations by adding more voices to the negotiating table. I argue that more mediators, all else equal, will decrease the probability of success; this effect can be offset, however, by coordination among the mediators. Empirical analyses of 312 mediation efforts in civil wars from 1989 to 2006 find that softer forms of leverage do reinforce material power, producing the greatest probability of concluding in a signed agreement when used together. Moreover, coordination substantially mitigates the negative effect of additional mediators.
"Competition, Aid, and Violence against Civilians" (2020) with Yooneui Kim. International Interactions 46(5): 696-723.
How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.
How do donor governments respond to recipient government violence against civilians? Violence against civilians undermines a common goal of aid: to reduce the risk and impact of instability or civil conflict. We show that donors care about recipient violence against civilians, under certain circumstances. We argue that government use of violence against civilians reduces aid allocations to recipient governments. Competition with other donors, especially rivals, however, will reduce donor sensitivity to government behavior. Testing these expectations on aid from 32 donors to 157 recipients between 1990 and 2013, we find that donors do respond to government violence against civilians but that this effect is conditioned by donor competition. Furthermore, this paper advances foreign aid scholarship by connecting the civil war literature to the strategic provision of aid literature and looking at an understudied form of government behavior in the aid and human rights literature: violence against civilians.
"Multiparty Mediation in Civil War" (2019) in Handbook on Mediating International Crises Eds. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, and David M. Quinn. Edward Elgar Publishing
This chapter explores when multiparty mediation efforts are most likely to occur as well as the effect of mediator composition on mediation success. It argues that the composition of multiparty efforts has important implications for mediation success. Understanding when multiparty efforts are most likely provides the foundation for considering how the nature of multiparty mediation effects mediation outcomes. Salience to the international community is expected to increase the number of mediators who intervene in a conflict-year. As battle deaths increase, the number of mediators also increases, providing support for this expectation. Next, three characteristics of mediation efforts—the number and diversity of mediators as well as coordination—are explored. Number of mediators is expected to reduce the likelihood of mediation success while diversity and coordination are expected to improve outcomes. Diversity and number have meaningful impacts on mediation outcomes in opposing directions, highlighting the importance of mediation composition.
This chapter explores when multiparty mediation efforts are most likely to occur as well as the effect of mediator composition on mediation success. It argues that the composition of multiparty efforts has important implications for mediation success. Understanding when multiparty efforts are most likely provides the foundation for considering how the nature of multiparty mediation effects mediation outcomes. Salience to the international community is expected to increase the number of mediators who intervene in a conflict-year. As battle deaths increase, the number of mediators also increases, providing support for this expectation. Next, three characteristics of mediation efforts—the number and diversity of mediators as well as coordination—are explored. Number of mediators is expected to reduce the likelihood of mediation success while diversity and coordination are expected to improve outcomes. Diversity and number have meaningful impacts on mediation outcomes in opposing directions, highlighting the importance of mediation composition.
"Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes" (2018) with Skyler J. Cranmer. International Interactions 44(2): 217-243.
Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Surprisingly, the empirical conflict literature has yet to address what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed. We argue that the team quality (defined in terms of the coalition’s skill, legitimacy, and coordination) of multinational military coalitions can provide such coalitions with better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing its conflict aims. Empirical tests, using Bayesian models, reveal that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success.
Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Surprisingly, the empirical conflict literature has yet to address what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed. We argue that the team quality (defined in terms of the coalition’s skill, legitimacy, and coordination) of multinational military coalitions can provide such coalitions with better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing its conflict aims. Empirical tests, using Bayesian models, reveal that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success.
"Kantian Fractionalization Predicts the Conflict Propensity of the International System" (2015) with Skyler J. Cranmer & Peter J. Mucha. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112(38):11812-11816.
- Winner of the 2016 Political Ties Award
Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena
in political science, including the study of international conflict.
We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing
that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along
three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for
violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established
conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit
for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures
combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting
system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical
finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal
variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal
relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as
changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction
of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve
as an early warning sign of international instability.
Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena
in political science, including the study of international conflict.
We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing
that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along
three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for
violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established
conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit
for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures
combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting
system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical
finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal
variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal
relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as
changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction
of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve
as an early warning sign of international instability.
"The Reputation Trap of NGO Accountability" (2015) with Stephen E. Gent, Mark J.C. Crescenzi, & Lindsay Reid. International Theory 7(3):426-463.
Can concerns for one’s reputation cause non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
alter their behavior to the detriment of achieving their policy goals? To answer this
question, we explore the relationship between NGOs and their donors. Our theoretical
model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of information in the decision to fund
an NGO’s activities. Reputation can become so important to the NGO’s survival that
it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. As such, reputations
can become a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the information donors
seek while constraining NGOs from realizing policy goals. We apply this logic to the
problem of NGO accountability, which has received increasing attention in recent
years, and demonstrate that the tools used by donors to improve accountability can
trigger unintended consequences. We illustrate this strategic dynamic with two types
of NGO activity: water improvement and international crisis mediation.
Can concerns for one’s reputation cause non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
alter their behavior to the detriment of achieving their policy goals? To answer this
question, we explore the relationship between NGOs and their donors. Our theoretical
model reveals that reputation can be a key piece of information in the decision to fund
an NGO’s activities. Reputation can become so important to the NGO’s survival that
it interferes with the long-term policy goals of the organization. As such, reputations
can become a double-edged sword, simultaneously providing the information donors
seek while constraining NGOs from realizing policy goals. We apply this logic to the
problem of NGO accountability, which has received increasing attention in recent
years, and demonstrate that the tools used by donors to improve accountability can
trigger unintended consequences. We illustrate this strategic dynamic with two types
of NGO activity: water improvement and international crisis mediation.
“Complex Dependencies in the Alliance Network” (2012) with Skyler J. Cranmer & Bruce A. Desmarais. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 29(3):279-313.
The multifaceted and strategic interactions inherent in the formation of international military pacts render the alliance decisions of states highly interdependent. Our aim here is to model the network of alliances in such a way as to capture the effects of covariates and account for the complex dependencies inherent in the network. Regression analysis, due to its foundational assumption of conditional independence, is inappropriate for analyzing alliance decisions specifically and interdependent decisions generally. We demonstrate how alliance decisions are interdependent and define the problems associated with the regression analysis of nonindependent dyads. We then show that alliances can naturally be conceived of as constituting a network, where alliance formation is an inherently interdependent process. We proceed by introducing the exponential random graph model for analyzing interdependence in the alliance network and estimating the effect of covariates on alliances.
The multifaceted and strategic interactions inherent in the formation of international military pacts render the alliance decisions of states highly interdependent. Our aim here is to model the network of alliances in such a way as to capture the effects of covariates and account for the complex dependencies inherent in the network. Regression analysis, due to its foundational assumption of conditional independence, is inappropriate for analyzing alliance decisions specifically and interdependent decisions generally. We demonstrate how alliance decisions are interdependent and define the problems associated with the regression analysis of nonindependent dyads. We then show that alliances can naturally be conceived of as constituting a network, where alliance formation is an inherently interdependent process. We proceed by introducing the exponential random graph model for analyzing interdependence in the alliance network and estimating the effect of covariates on alliances.
External Grants
National Science Foundation (2022),"Collaborative Research: Cooperation in Multi-Dyadic Civil Conflicts", co-PI with Alyssa Prorok
Army Research Office (2020), "Tainting the Well or Priming the Pump? The Dynamics of Cooperation in Civil War", co-PI with Alyssa Prorok
Folke Bernadotte Academy Research Grant (2019), "Negotiation Dynamics: Evaluating the Cumulative Effects of Negotiations in Civil War Resolution", co-PI with Alyssa Prorok